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“Chartering” in the Shadow of 
Lochner: Guindon, Goodwin and the 
Criminal-Administrative Distinction 
at the Supreme Court of Canada 
Steven Penney 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The distinction between criminal and administrative wrongdoing 
plays a key role in Canadian public law. Though it functions somewhat 
differently across domains, the upshot is the same: the state is 
presumptively entitled, as a principle of statutory and constitutional 
interpretation, to more favourable procedures for establishing administrative 
wrongdoing than criminal offending. Conversely, people accused of 
administrative infractions are presumptively entitled to less protection 
against state power in the investigative and adjudicative process than 
those charged with crimes (or in many cases, regulatory offences). 
The criminal-administrative distinction has a long pedigree,1 but has 
taken on heightened importance since the Charter.2 The entrenchment of 
the Charter’s “legal rights” provisions emboldened lawyers to claim the 
same procedural protections for persons accused of non-criminal 
wrongdoing that statute and common law had typically (but not 
universally) provided to criminal defendants. With few exceptions, these 
claims have failed. Despite long-standing criticism of its doctrinal 
                                                                                                                                  
 Faculty of Law, University of Alberta. The author wishes to thank Caitlyn Field  
(J.D. 2017) for research assistance and the organizers of, and participants at, the 19th Annual 
Constitutional Cases Conference at Osgoode Hall Law School at York University. 
1 See, e.g., Beaver v. The Queen, [1957] S.C.J. No. 32, [1957] S.C.R. 531 (S.C.C.), varg 
[1956] O.J. No. 342 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Pierce Fisheries Ltd., [1970] S.C.J. No. 58, [1971] S.C.R. 5 
(S.C.C.), revg [1969] N.S.J. No. 103 (N.S.C.A.); R. v. Sault Ste. Marie, [1978] S.C.J. No. 59, [1978] 
2 S.C.R. 1299 (S.C.C.), affg 13 O.R. (2d) 113 (Ont. C.A.). 
2 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter the “Charter”]. 
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coherence and policy justifications, the Supreme Court of Canada has 
repeatedly confirmed the distinction’s vitality and applied it to deny 
Charter challenges by persons deemed to be operating in the administrative 
sphere. The Court has been far more willing, in contrast, to find Charter 
violations in the criminal context. 
The Court’s 2015 decisions in Guindon v. Canada3 and Goodwin 
v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles)4 did little to 
change this. In each case, the Court decided that persons facing 
substantial penalties for issuing fraudulent tax receipts and impaired 
driving, respectively, were not “charged with an offence” under section 11 
of the Charter. They were thus not entitled to the numerous rights 
guaranteed by that provision, including the right “to be presumed 
innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing 
by an independent and impartial tribunal” under paragraph (d). The Court 
in Goodwin did find, however, that aspects of the process violated the 
right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure in section 8 of the 
Charter.  
What accounts for the Court’s enduring reluctance to require 
administrative penalty regimes, as a constitutional mandate, to adhere to 
the basic procedural protections applying even to low-level criminal and 
quasi-criminal prosecutions? There are likely many answers. But one is 
the Court’s admitted fear that doing so would frustrate governments’ 
ability to regulate economic activity in the public interest.  
This article’s aim is to trace the origins of this fear and assess its 
legitimacy. The fear stems largely from a century-old decision from the 
Supreme Court of the United States, the infamous Lochner v. New York.5 
By the second half of the last century, jurists in the United States and 
Canada had come to view Lochner as the embodiment of an almost 
universally derided era of constitutional law. The Lochner Court, in their 
view, used a rigid and formalist interpretation of the Bill of Rights to 
limit state efforts to enact and enforce progressive economic legislation. 
Mindful of that experience, Canadian judges interpreting the Charter  
in the last decades of the 20th century drew a bright line between  
 
                                                                                                                                  
3 [2015] S.C.J. No. 41, 2015 SCC 41, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.), affg [2013] F.C.J. No. 673 
(F.C.A.) [hereinafter “Guindon“]. 
4 [2015] S.C.J. No. 46, 2015 SCC 46, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 250 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Goodwin“]. 
5 198 U.S. 45 (1905) [hereinafter “Lochner“]. 
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administrative and criminal regulation, granting the state a largely 
unfettered freedom in the former and imposing often exacting constraints 
in the latter.  
Lochner-era jurisprudence is (mostly) deserving of its reputation, and 
some lines between administrative and criminal law are certainly 
defensible. But Canadian courts’ fear of Lochner has been excessive and 
caused them to underestimate the threat that administrative regulation 
poses to individual liberty. Criminal penalties are often harsher and more 
stigmatizing than administrative ones, and criminal defendants typically 
more vulnerable, disadvantaged and disempowered than many of the 
persons (natural and corporate) subject to administrative regulation.  
But not always. Legislatures have increasingly relied on administrative 
and civil enforcement regimes to address forms of wrongdoing 
previously left to the criminal law.6 In many instances, the sanctions 
accompanying these regimes are harsh, the targets are ordinary people, 
and the rules protecting adjudicative fairness are weak.7  
As currently formulated, however, the criminal-administrative 
distinction is ill-suited to manage this phenomenon. I focus on the test 
used to decide whether a person is “charged with an offence” under 
section 11 of the Charter, which hinges on the distinction between 
criminal and administrative regulation. I argue that the current test is 
rigid and formalistic (ironically, much like Lochner) and advocate for a 
more flexible, functional and purposive interpretation that puts a greater 
burden on government to justify elisions of adjudicative fairness norms. 
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. In Part II, I briefly 
recount the history of the Lochner era, including Lochner’s Fourth and 
Fifth Amendment8 analogue, Boyd v. United States.9 Part III examines 
Canadian courts’ reaction to Lochner and relates the formation of the 
                                                                                                                                  
6 See D. McLeod, “Facing the Consequences: Should the Charter Apply to Administrative 
Proceedings Involving Monetary Penalties?” (2012) 30 N.J.C.L. 59; W. Michael G. Osborne, 
“Raising the AMPerage: The Spread of Administrative Monetary Penalties In Canada” (2011), 
online: <http://www.thelitigator.ca/2011/01/raising-the-amperage>; R.M. Brown, “Administrative 
and Criminal Penalties in the Enforcement of Occupational Health and Safety Legislation” (1992) 30 
Osgoode Hall L.J. 691. 
7 See, e.g., Doyon v. Canada (Attorney General), [2009] F.C.J. No. 605, 2009 FCA 152,  
at paras. 20-29 (F.C.A.). 
8 U.S. Const. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”); amend. V, cl. 3  
(no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself”). 
9 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
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administrative-regulatory distinction in the jurisprudence interpreting 
sections 7, 8, and 11 of the Charter. In Part IV, I examine Guindon and 
Goodwin and propose a more expansive interpretation of section 11, 
arguing that such an interpretation poses no Lochnerian threat to the 
Canadian welfare state. Part V concludes.  
II. THE LOCHNER ERA 
The story of Lochner is well known. In 1906, the Supreme Court 
struck down a New York law prohibiting bakery employees from 
working more than 10 hours a day or 60 hours a week. The Court 
interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause10 to protect 
employers’ and employees’ rights to contract freely for labour. These 
rights could be superseded by the state’s “police” power to limit 
contractual freedom for the purposes of “safety, health, morals and 
general welfare of the public”,11 but only for a “fair, reasonable and 
appropriate exercise” of that power.12 The New York law, the Court 
adjudged, did not meet this standard, its relationship to health being 
remote at best.13 Instead, it constituted an “illegal interference with the 
rights of individuals, both employers and employees, to make contracts 
regarding labor upon such terms as they may think best …”.14 Laws that 
simply imposed maximum hours without an adequate health or safety 
justification, Peckham J. wrote, “are mere meddlesome interferences 
with the rights of the individual”.15  
Lochner spawned more than two decades of decisions invalidating 
labour and other public welfare legislation on due process grounds.16 Not 
every exercise of the police power was struck down, but the rulings did 
significantly limit legislatures’ capacity to insulate workers from the 
                                                                                                                                  
10 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1, cl. 3 (“No state shall … deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law”). 
11 Lochner, supra, note 5, at 53. 
12 Id., at 56. 
13 Id., at 58-61. 
14 Id., at 61. 
15 Id. 
16 See, e.g., Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations of State of Kansas, 
262 U.S. 522 (1923); Schnaier v. Navarre Hotel & Importation Co., 70 L.R.A. 722 (1905); Coppage v. 
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917). The Lochner Court also struck 
down numerous federal laws under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. See e.g., Adkins v. 
Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908). See U.S. 
Const. amend. V, cl. 4 (“No person shall be … deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law”). 
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rigours of the market.17 However, in the face of the Great Depression and 
an emerging political consensus in favour of greater social welfare and 
governmental intervention in the economy, the Court eventually 
retreated, becoming increasingly willing to justify economic regulation 
as a reasonable limit on contractual freedom.18 And in its 1937 decision 
in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, it all but repudiated Lochner, upholding a 
minimum wage law for women and declaring that legislatures should 
have “a wide field of discretion” to regulate employer-employee relations 
to not only protect health and safety, but also promote “peace and  
good order” and “insure wholesome conditions of work and freedom 
from oppression”.19  
Less well known is the Lochner era’s criminal procedure 
jurisprudence. The keystone case, Boyd v. United States,20 was decided 
19 years before Lochner. Boyd displayed the same natural rights-based, 
formalist conception of the Bill of Rights as Lochner, as well as the same 
hostility to governmental regulation of private economic activity.21  
In 1884, the Boyd company contracted with the United States government 
to supply imported glass for a federal building.22 Suspecting fraud, 
customs officials seized one of Boyd’s shipments, brought a civil 
forfeiture action, and obtained a subpoena requiring Boyd to produce the 
invoice from a previous shipment.23 Boyd complied, but claimed 
violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                                  
17 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, “Lochner‘s Legacy” (1987) 87 Colum. L. Rev. 873; 
David E. Bernstein, “Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental 
Rights Constitutionalism” (2003) 92 Geo. L.J. 1; Victoria F. Nourse, “A Tale of Two Lochners: The 
Untold History of Substantive Due Process and the idea of Fundamental Rights” (2009) 97 Cal. L. 
Rev. 751. 
18 See generally Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 2d ed. (Mineola, NY: 
The Foundation Press, 1988), §§8-5 – 8-7 [hereinafter “Tribe”]. 
19 300 U.S. 379, at 393 (1937). 
20 116 U.S. 616, at 617 (1886) [hereinafter “Boyd“]. 
21 See Akhil Reed Amar, “Fourth Amendment First Principles” (1994) 107 Harv. L. Rev. 757, 
at 791 [hereinafter “Amar”]; Morgan Cloud, “The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: 
Privacy, Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory” (1996) 48 Stan. L. Rev. 555, at 579-81 
[hereinafter “Cloud”]. 
22 See “Boyd v. United States” in Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper, eds., Landmark 
Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States: Constitutional Law, vol. 8 
(Arlington, VA: University Publications of America, 1975), at 480-85, 506-509; Donald Dripps, 
“‘Dearest Property’: Digital Evidence and the History of ‘Private Papers’ as Special Objects of 
Search and Seizure” (2013) 103 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 49, at 95-97. 
23 The subpoena was obtained pursuant to Act of 22 June 1874, c. 391, § 5, 18 Stat. 187  
(19 U.S.C. § 535 (2015)). 
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agreed and excluded the invoice as evidence against Boyd.24 Applying 
what would later become known as the “mere evidence” rule,25 it 
declared that the Fourth Amendment prohibited the government from 
taking of non-illicit property for evidentiary purposes, even if it had 
ample grounds for suspicion and a warrant for the seizure.26 It further 
proclaimed that compelling Boyd to provide the invoice violated the 
Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination clause.27 “Compulsory discovery” 
or “compelling the production of … private books and papers”, Bradley 
J. wrote, is “contrary to the principles of a free government” and “cannot 
abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty and personal freedom”.28  
As William Stuntz has pointed out, though Boyd is considered a 
cornerstone of turn-of-the-century constitutional criminal procedure, 
during the Lochner era it had only a limited effect on ordinary criminal 
cases.29 Most criminal law was (and remains) state law, and the Supreme 
Court did not “incorporate” the Fourth and Fifth Amendments into the 
Fourteenth (thereby applying them to the states) until the 1960s.30 
Further, on its face, Boyd only prohibited the seizure or compulsory 
production of documents.31 During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, 
police rarely sought this type of evidence during criminal investigations.32 
                                                                                                                                  
24 Boyd, supra, note 20. See also Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), 41 S. Ct. 
261 [hereinafter “Gouled“]. 
25 Courts began using this phrase to describe the Boyd/Gouled rule in the 1930s. See, e.g., 
Foley v. United States, 64 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1933), cert denied, 289 U.S. 762 (1933); Landau v. 
United States, 82 F.2d 285, at 287 (2nd Cir. 1936), cert denied, 56 S. Ct. 747 (1936). See generally 8 
Wigmore, Evidence, §2184a (McNaughton rev., 1961) (defining “mere evidence” as anything 
“which is neither contraband nor tools nor fruits of crime, but which consists of private documents 
or other chattels of the defendant wanted by the government solely for its evidential value”). 
26 Boyd, supra, note 20, at 623. 
27 Id., at 633. The Court concluded that while the forfeiture proceeding was nominally civil 
in nature, for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment it was “in substance and effect a criminal one”: 
id., at 634. In separate, unreported proceedings, the owners of the company were also convicted 
criminally. Though the ruling does not appear in the decision, the Supreme Court also vacated their 
criminal conviction. See Dripps, supra, note 22, at 96. 
28 Boyd, supra, note 20, at 631-32. See also Gouled, supra, note 24, at 303-304. 
29 William J. Stuntz, “The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure” (1995) 105 Yale L.J. 
393 [hereinafter “Stuntz”]. 
30 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
31 Later courts did, however, sometimes apply the mere evidence rule to other kinds of 
evidence, such as clothing. See e.g., Morrison v. United States, 262 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1958); La Rue 
v. State, 197 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. Cr. App. 1946); Williams v. United States, 263 F.2d 487, at 488 (D.C. 
Cir. 1959), cert denied, 365 U.S. 836 (1961); Hayden v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 363 F.2d 647 (4th 
Cir. 1966). See also generally Steven Penney, “‘Mere Evidence’: Why Customs Searches of Digital 
Devices Violate s. 8 of the Charter” (2016) 49:2 U.B.C. L. Rev. 485 at 492-93. 
32 Stuntz, supra, note 29, at 423. 
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Boyd did have the potential, however, to thwart the enforcement of 
federal economic regulation.33 And so it did — to some extent. During 
the Lochner years, courts frequently deployed the mere evidence rule to 
prevent the government from compelling documents and testimony  
in business regulation cases, including bankruptcy,34 antitrust35 and 
white-collar fraud.36 
As with Lochner, the courts did not always apply Boyd to prohibit 
governmental intrusions on property rights and individual liberty.  
Even in the prime of the Lochner era, the Court sometimes permitted 
government to obtain documents characterized as either instrumentalities 
of crime37 or legally required business records.38 And by mid-century, 
many federal courts were stretching the instrumentality exception to the 
point of gutting the rule.39 Finally, in Warden v. Hayden, the Supreme 
Court discarded the mere evidence rule altogether.40 Justice Brennan 
declared for the majority that “[t]he premise that property interests 
control the right of the Government to search and seize has been 
discredited” and that the “principal object” of the Fourth Amendment  
“is the protection of privacy rather than property”.41 And since privacy 
“is disturbed no more by a search directed to a purely evidentiary object 
than it is by a search directed to an instrumentality, fruit, or contraband”, 
it was “wholly irrational” to distinguish between the two categories.42 
After Warden v. Hayden, Fourth Amendment cases would turn not on the 
                                                                                                                                  
33 Id., at 425-27. 
34 See, e.g., In re Harris, 164 F. 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1908); In re Hess, 134 F. 109 (E.D. Pa. 
1905); Potter v. Beal, 49 F. 793 (C.C.D. Mass. 1892). 
35 See e.g., Councilman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 
at 606-608 (1896). 
36 See, e.g., Gouled, supra, note 24. 
37 See Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 24 S. Ct. 372 (1904); Marron v. United States, 
275 U.S. 192, 48 S. Ct. 74 (1927); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, at 237-38, 80 S. Ct. 683 
(1960); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, at 64, 70 S. Ct. 430 (1950); Harris v. United States, 
331 U.S. 145, at 154, 67 S. Ct. 1098 (1947). 
38 See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, at 74-75, 26 S. Ct. 370 (1906); Wilson v. United States, 
221 U.S. 361, at 377-85, 31 S. Ct. 538 (1911); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 1375 
(1948). 
39 See, e.g., Golliher v. United States, 362 F.2d 594 (8th Cir. 1966); United States v. Guido, 
251 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1958); Morton v. United States, 147 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1945); United States v. 
Boyette, 299 F.2d 92 (4th Cir. 1962). 
40 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) [hereinafter “Warden“]. See also Andressen v. 
Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, at 471-73 (1976); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, at 405-14 (1976). 
41 Warden, id., at 304. 
42 Id., at 301-302. 
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form of evidence, but rather simply “reasonableness”, which presumptively 
entails warrants based on probable cause.43  
Though Boyd never became as reviled as Lochner,44 commentators 
have long denounced the mere evidence rule that it proclaimed.45  
The distinction between inadmissible mere evidence and admissible 
instrumentalities, critics asserted, was incoherent.46 Even worse, the rule 
thwarted legitimate law enforcement efforts47 and perversely protected 
wrongdoing (economic and otherwise).48 Like Lochner, Boyd ultimately 
came to be viewed as a formalist anachronism, incompatible with 
modern conceptions of legal pragmatism, policing and economic 
regulation.49 Relatedly, Boyd was also, as Lochner’s ideological cousin, a 
product of the Supreme Court’s revanchist hostility to the emergent 
welfare state.50  
                                                                                                                                  
43 Id., at 309-10. 
44 Citing the significant negative academic commentary on Lochner would require an 
article-length footnote. For a summary of leading contributions, see Sujit Choudhry, “The Lochner 
Era and Comparative Constitutionalism” (2004) 2 Int. J. Constitutional Law 1, at 4-15 [hereinafter 
“Choudhry”]. 
45 See 8 Wigmore, Evidence, §§2184a, 2264 (McNaughton rev., 1961); John MacArthur 
Maguire, Evidence of Guilt: Restrictions upon its Discovery or Compulsory Disclosure (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Co., 1959), at §5.04; “Eavesdropping Orders and the Fourth Amendment”, 
Comment (1966) 66 Colum L. Rev. 355, at 359-70; Charles T. Newton Jr., “The Mere Evidence 
Rule: Doctrine or Dogma?” (1967) 45 Tex. L. Rev. 526; Zechariah Chafee Jr., “The Progress of the Law, 
1919-1922: Evidence III” (1922) 35 Harv. L. Rev. 673, at 699-700; John Kaplan, “Search and 
Seizure: A No-Man’s Land in the Criminal Law” (1961) 49 Cal. L. Rev. 474, at 477-79; William T. Rintala, 
“The Mere Evidence Rule: Limitations on Seizure under the Fourth Amendment” (1966) 54 Cal. L. 
Rev. 2099 [hereinafter “Rintala”]; David R. Manwaring, “California and the Fourth Amendment” 
(1964) 16 Stan. L. Rev. 318, at 327-28; “Limitations on Seizure of ‘Evidentiary’ Objects: A Rule in 
Search of a Reason”, Comment (1953) 20 U. Chicago L. Rev. 319, at 320-22 [hereinafter “Chicago 
Comment”]. 
46 See Newton, id., at 542-45; Kamisar, infra, note 48, at 916-18; Chicago Comment, id. 
47 See Rintala, supra, note 45, at 2100-101. 
48 See Yale Kamisar, “The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Professor’s View” 
(1960) 44 Minn. L. Rev. 891, at 915-16; Roger J. Traynor, “Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty 
States” [1962] Duke L.J. 319, at 331. 
49 See Amar, supra, note 21, at 791; Cloud, supra, note 21, at 560-61; William J. Stuntz, 
The Collapse of American Criminal Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011),  
at 198. Boyd, and to a lesser degree, Lochner, have lately been rehabilitated in some quarters of the 
legal academy. See generally Cloud, supra, note 21; Dripps, supra, note 22; Randy E. Barnett, 
Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 2004); David E. Bernstein, Rehabilitating Lochner: Defending Individual Rights Against 
Progressive Reform (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2011). 
50 See Cloud, supra, note 21, at 571-73; Thomas Y. Davies, “The Supreme Court Giveth 
and The Supreme Court Taketh Away: The Century of Fourth Amendment ‘Search And Seizure’ 
Doctrine” (2010) 100 J. Crim L. & Criminology 933, at 965. 
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III. LOCHNER AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE-CRIMINAL  
DISTINCTION IN CANADA 
Unsurprisingly, Canadian courts’ distaste for Lochner51 has been most 
evident when claimants have asserted proprietary or contractual claims 
under the Charter. In his concurring reasons in the Prostitution Reference, 
for example, Lamer J. rejected the notion that the right not to be deprived 
of “liberty … except in accordance with the principles of fundamental 
justice” under section 7 contemplated economic liberty.52 Lochner and its 
siblings, he stressed, “have a specific historical context, a context that 
incorporated into the American jurisprudence certain laissez-faire 
principles that may not have a corresponding application to the 
interpretation of the Charter in the present day”.53 Similar sentiments have 
been expressed in other Supreme Court54 and lower court opinions.55  
                                                                                                                                  
51 On the antipathy towards Lochner of the Charter’s drafters and judicial interpreters, see 
generally Choudhry, supra, note 44; K. Michael Stephens, “Fidelity to Fundamental Justice: An 
Originalist Construction of Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (2002)  
13 N.J.C.L. 183; Ian Greene, The Charter of Rights (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1989), at 146;  
Peter W. Hogg, “Canada’s New Charter of Rights” (1984) 32 Am. J. Comp. L. 283, at 290 [hereinafter 
“Hogg”]; Patrick J. Monahan, Politics and the Constitution: The Charter, Federalism and the 
Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1987), at 76; Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of 
Canada, 5th ed. (supplemented), vol. 2, loose-leaf (Toronto: Carswell, 2007), at §§ 36.4(b), 47.7(b). 
52 Reference re Criminal Code (Canada) ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code 
(Man.), [1990] S.C.J. No. 52, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 (S.C.C.), affg [1987] M.J. No. 453 (Man. C.A.), 
Lamer J., concurring. In his plurality reasons in the Prostitution Reference, Dickson C.J.C. expressly 
declined to decide whether liberty or security of the person “could ever apply to any interest with an 
economic, commercial or property component” (at para. 15, emphasis in original). See also R. v. 
Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, at para. 150 (S.C.C.), 
Dickson C.J.C. (“Whatever the precise contours of ‘liberty’ in s. 7, I cannot accept that it extends to 
an unconstrained right to transact business whenever one wishes.”); Bernard v. Dartmouth Housing 
Authority, [1988] N.S.J. No. 283, 53 D.L.R. (4th) 81 (N.S.C.A.), leave to appeal refused (1989), 89 
N.S.R. (2d) 270n (S.C.C.). 
53 Id., at para. 60. 
54 See e.g., Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alberta), [1987] S.C.J. 
No. 10, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, at 412 (S.C.C.), affg [1984] A.J. No. 616 (Alta. C.A.), McIntyre J., 
concurring (“It is also to be observed that the Charter, with the possible exception of s. 6(2)(b) (right 
to earn a livelihood in any province) and s. 6(4), does not concern itself with economic rights.”);  
R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at 138-39 (S.C.C.), revg [1985] O.J.  
No. 2662 (Ont. C.A.), McIntyre J., dissenting (“The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner … and like 
cases — that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the 
legislature has acted unwisely — has long since been discarded.”); Children’s Aid: B. (R.) v. Children’s 
Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1995] S.C.J. No. 24, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315, at 370 (S.C.C.), affg 
[1992] O.J. No. 1915 (Ont. C.A.) (referring to the “Lochner era” as a “much criticized period in 
which the Supreme Court engaged in substantive review of many economic and social statutes.”); 
Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, 2005 SCC 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, at 
paras. 201-202 (S.C.C.), revg [2002] J.Q. no 759 (Que. C.A.), Binnie and LeBel JJ., dissenting; Irwin 
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Lochner has also been disapproved of in Canadian Bill of Rights 
cases. Though section 1(a) of the Bill of Rights expressly protects the 
right not to be deprived of the “enjoyment of property” except by “due 
process of law”, courts have consistently rejected challenges to 
legislatively authorized government takings.56 And in finding that  
section 1(a) did not preclude Parliament from preventing disabled 
veterans from claiming interest owed to them on trust moneys held by 
the government, the Supreme Court noted that Lochner “might have cast 
a shadow over the recognition of substantive due process rights in 
Canadian jurisprudence”.57  
The negative reception of Lochner in Canada extended to criminal 
quasi-criminal law and helped shape the administrative-criminal 
distinction. In R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc.,58 the appellant was 
charged with disseminating false or misleading advertising under the 
Competition Act.59 Like many regulatory statutes, the Act imposed “strict 
liability” for violations of its prohibitions. As a consequence, the offence 
was deemed to be established upon proof of the actus reus (i.e., that the 
advertising was objectively misleading), but permitted a defence of “due 
diligence” if the defendant could prove, on a balance of probabilities, 
                                                                                                             
Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, at 1003-1004 
(S.C.C.), revg [1986] J.Q. no 1650 (Que. C.A.) (contrasting s. 7 of Charter with Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendment due process clauses and asserting that economic rights not generally within scope of 
Charter protection). 
55 See e.g., Mathew v. Canada, [2002] T.C.J. No. 222, at paras. 359, 460-469 (T.C.C.), affd 
[2003] F.C.J. No. 1470 (F.C.A.), affd [2005] S.C.J. No. 55, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 643 (S.C.C.); Gosselin 
v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1999] J.Q. no 1365 (Que. C.A.), affd [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, [2002]  
4 S.C.R. 429 (S.C.C.); Skalbania (Trustee of) v. Wedgewood Village Estates Ltd., [1989] B.C.J.  
No. 965, 60 D.L.R. (4th) 43, at paras. 28-29 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal refused [1989] S.C.C.A. No 274 
(S.C.C.); Archibald v. Canada, [1997] F.C.J. No. 394, [1997] 3 F.C.R. 335 (F.C.T.D.), affd [2000] 
F.C.J. No. 857 (F.C.A.); Smith, Kline & French Laboratories Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), 
[1986] 1 F.C. 274, at 314 (F.C.T.D.), affd [1986] F.C.J. No. 787, [1987] 2 F.C. 359 (F.C.A.). 
56 Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44 [reproduced in R.S.C. 1985, App. III]. See 
Authorson v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] S.C.J. No. 40, 2003 SCC 39, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 40,  
at para. 51 (S.C.C.) (“The Bill of Rights does not protect against the expropriation of property by  
the passage of unambiguous legislation.”). See also generally Manitoba Fisheries Ltd. v. The 
Queen, [1978] S.C.J. No. 78, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 101 (S.C.C.), revg [1977] F.C.J. No. 165 (F.C.A.); 
Wells v. Newfoundland, [1999] S.C.J. No. 50, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 199, at para. 41 (S.C.C.), affg [1997] 
N.J. No. 250 (Nfld. C.A.). 
57 Authorson, id., at para. 49. See also Curr v. The Queen, [1972] S.C.J. No. 66, [1972] 
S.C.R. 889, at 902 (S.C.C.), affg [1971] O.J. No. 1618 (Ont. H.C.J.). 
58 [1991] S.C.J. No. 79, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 154 (S.C.C.), varg [1989] O.J. No. 1971 (Ont. C.A.) 
[hereinafter “R. v. Wholesale Travel“]. 
59 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23, s. 36(1). 
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that it took reasonable care to prevent the error.60 The Court had 
previously held in criminal cases that imposing a persuasive burden on 
the accused (i.e., a reverse onus) to establish a defence infringed the 
presumption of innocence in section 11(d) of the Charter, though in some 
cases that infringement could be justified under section 1.61 And it has 
since found that section 7 prohibits criminal liability (involving at least a 
theoretical possibility of imprisonment) on anything less than “marked 
departure” (i.e., gross negligence) standard of fault.62 But in Wholesale 
Travel, it held that for regulatory or administrative infractions, 
legislatures could always impose a reverse onus to prove due diligence.63 
And it concluded that for such infractions, imposing the fault standard of 
ordinary negligence did not violate section 7.  
Each of the majority opinions in Wholesale Travel emphasized the 
distinctiveness of regulatory offences and the social importance of easing 
the prosecution’s burden in proving them. And in his lengthy exposition 
on the criminal-regulatory distinction, Cory J. expressly invoked the 
history of Lochner. He explained: 
… [M]uch government regulation is designed to protect the vulnerable. 
It would be unfortunate indeed if the Charter were used as a weapon to 
attack measures intended to protect the disadvantaged and comparatively 
powerless members of society. It is interesting to observe that in the 
United States, courts struck down important components of the program  
 
                                                                                                                                  
60 Id., s. 37.3(2). To escape liability after proof of the actus reus, this provision also 
required the defendant to establish that it made reasonable and timely efforts to notify the targets of 
the advertising. The Court unanimously held that these requirements exceeded the scope of the 
ordinary due diligence defence and were consequently unconstitutional: R. v. Wholesale Travel, 
supra, note 58, at 188-95, Lamer C.J.C., dissenting, 252-53, Cory J., 255, Iacobucci J., 260, 
McLachlin J. 
61 See R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.), affg [1983] O.J.  
No. 2501 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Whyte, [1988] S.C.J. No. 63, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.), affg [1983] 
B.C.J. No. 2452 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Chaulk, [1990] S.C.J. No. 139, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303 (S.C.C.). 
62 For a limited category of very serious offences carrying a sufficiently high degree of 
stigma, s. 7 is violated where fault can be established by anything less than (subjective) recklessness. 
See R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 (S.C.C.), revg [1984] J.Q. no 166 
(Que. C.A.) (murder); R. v. Logan, [1990] S.C.J. No. 89, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 731 (S.C.C.), affg [1988] 
O.J. No. 2107 (Ont. C.A.) (attempted murder); R. v. Finta, [1994] S.C.J. No. 26, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701 
(S.C.C.), affg [1992] O.J. No. 823 (Ont. C.A.) (war crimes and crimes against humanity). 
63 The route to this conclusion varied slightly as between the two judgments in the majority. 
Justice Iacobucci found that the reverse onus in regulatory offences, as in criminal offences, 
infringed s. 11(d). He concluded, however, that this infringement was justified under s. 1, not just for 
the impugned Competition Act provisions, but for all regulatory offences. Justice Cory found that 
regulatory reverse onuses do not even infringe s. 11(d). 
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of regulatory legislation known as “the New Deal”. This so-called 
“Lochner era” is now almost universally regarded by academic writers 
as a dark age in the history of the American Constitution.64 
The criminal-administrative binary also plays a critical role in 
section 8 Charter doctrine. To be considered reasonable under that 
provision, searches or seizures in criminal investigations must comply 
with more demanding standards than those in administrative inquiries.65 
In the former, section 8 often requires warrants based on probable 
grounds. In the latter, authorities are frequently free to search without 
satisfying either of these conditions.66 Statutory powers compelling the 
production of business and tax records, for example, do not generally 
require either prior authorization or objective grounds for suspicion.67 
The Court has also upheld powers to inspect businesses for regulatory 
compliance without warrants or objective grounds for suspicion.68  
To comply with section 8, investigators need only show that they acted 
in good faith in pursuit of legitimate regulatory objectives.69 Broad 
surveillance powers, the Court has stated, are necessary for the effective 
regulation of industrial and economic activity.70 Requiring warrants and 
                                                                                                                                  
64 R. v. Wholesale Travel, supra, note 58, at 233-34. 
65 See generally Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and 
Research, Restrictive Trade Practices Commission), [1990] S.C.J. No. 23, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425 
(S.C.C.), affg [1986] O.J. No. 1066 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Thomson“]. 
66 See, e.g., Thomson, id., at 506-507, La Forest J.; R. v. Jarvis, [2002] S.C.J. No. 76, 
[2002] 3 S.C.R. 757, 2002 SCC 73 at para. 72 (S.C.C.); 143471 Canada Inc. v. Quebec (Attorney 
General); Tabah v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1994] S.C.J. No. 45, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 339, at 378 
(S.C.C.), affg [1992] J.Q. no 292 (Que. C.A.), Cory J.; Comité paritaire de l’industrie de la chemise 
v. Potash; Comite paritaire de l’industrie de la chemise v. Selection Milton, [1994] S.C.J. No. 7, 
[1994] 2 S.C.R. 406, at 420-21 (S.C.C.), revg [1992] J.Q. no 1012 (Que. C.A.) [hereinafter “Comité 
paritaire”]; R. v. Fitzpatrick, [1995] S.C.J. No. 94, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 154, at para. 49 (S.C.C.); R. v. 
McKinlay Transport Ltd., [1990] S.C.J. No. 25, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 627, at 649-50 (S.C.C.), affg [1987] 
O.J. No. 1130 (Ont. C.A.), Wilson J. [hereinafter “McKinlay Transport Ltd.”]. 
67 See Thomson, supra, note 65; McKinlay Transport Ltd., id. (tax); R. v. Jarvis, [2002] 
S.C.J. No. 76, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 757, 2002 SCC 73 (S.C.C.); R. v. Ling, [2002] S.C.J. No. 75, 2002 
SCC 74, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 814 (S.C.C.), affg [2000] B.C.J. No. 2082 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Fitzpatrick, id., 
at paras. 49-51; British Columbia (Securities Commission) v. Branch, [1995] S.C.J. No. 32, [1995] 2 
S.C.R. 3, at paras. 51-64 (S.C.C.), affg [1992] B.C.J. No. 164 (B.C.C.A.). See generally Steven Penney, 
Vincenzo Rondinelli & James Stribopoulos, Criminal Procedure in Canada (Toronto: LexisNexis 
Canada, 2011), at §§3.144-3.152. 
68 See Comité paritaire, supra, note 66. 
69 Id., at 422-23; Thomson, supra, note 65, at 531-32. 
70 Thomson, supra, note 65. 
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probable grounds would frustrate government’s ability to protect the 
vulnerable and regulate in the public interest.71  
Lastly, the distinction between criminal and administrative 
wrongdoing lies at the heart of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on 
section 11 of the Charter. As noted, the adjudicative fairness rights 
enumerated in that provision attach only to persons “charged with an 
offence”. The Court has interpreted this phrase to apply only to “persons 
prosecuted by the State for public offences involving punitive sanctions, 
i.e., criminal, quasi-criminal and regulatory offences, either federally or 
provincially enacted”.72 As Justice Wilson elaborated for the majority in 
Wigglesworth, this definition encompasses both proceedings that are 
criminal by their “very nature” as well as those that “may lead to a true 
penal consequence”.73 Penalties “intended to promote public order and 
welfare within a public sphere of activity,” she wrote, fall within  
section 11.74 Those imposed in “private, domestic or disciplinary matters 
which are regulatory, protective or corrective and which are primarily 
intended to maintain discipline, professional integrity and professional 
standards or to regulate conduct within a limited private sphere of 
activity” do not.75  
In subsequent decisions, the Court has provided further guidance on 
the meaning of each of these thresholds. In Shubley and Martineau, it 
clarified that the “criminal in nature” test refers not to the “nature of the 
act which gave rise to the proceedings, but the nature of the proceedings 
themselves”.76 The fact that alleged wrongdoers could be prosecuted 
criminally, therefore, does not mean that any non-criminal proceeding 
                                                                                                                                  
71 Id., at 526. See also McKinlay Transport Ltd., supra, note 66, at 648, Wilson J. Not all 
regulatory searches are exempt from the Hunter requirements. The Supreme Court noted in 
Thomson, for example, that prior authorization on probable grounds was required in Hunter because 
authorities could acquire sensitive personal information as well as business documents. Thomson, 
supra, note 65, at 520-21. See also McKinlay Transport Ltd., supra, note 66, at 649, Wilson J.; 
Baron v. Canada, [1993] S.C.J. No. 6, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 416 at 444-45. Warrants and probable 
grounds are also presumptively required where the state’s “predominant purpose” is to uncover 
evidence of “penal liability” rather than monitor regulatory compliance: see R. v. Jarvis, [2002] 
S.C.J. No. 76, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 757, 2002 SCC 73 at paras. 2, 46, 88, and 99 (S.C.C.). 
72 R. v. Wigglesworth, [1987] S.C.J. No. 71, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 541, at 554 (S.C.C.), affg 
[1984] S.J. No. 204 (Sask. C.A.) [hereinafter “Wigglesworth“]. 
73 Id., at 559. 
74 Id., at 560. 
75 Id. 
76 R. v. Shubley, [1990] S.C.J. No. 1, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 3, at 18-19 (S.C.C.), affg [1988] O.J. 
No. 57 (Ont. C.A.) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter “Shubley“]; Martineau v. Canada (Minister of 
National Revenue), [2004] S.C.J. No. 58, 2004 SCC 81, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 737 (S.C.C.), affg [2003] 
F.C.J. No. 557 (F.C.A.) (quoting Shubley, id.) [hereinafter “Martineau“]. 
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against them triggers section 11.77 If the proceedings to enforce the 
prohibition and impose a penalty lack the conventional indicia of a 
criminal prosecution (such as summons or arrest, the laying of an 
information, or a trial in a court of criminal jurisdiction), they will be 
considered administrative.78  
The true penal consequence test will always be satisfied by the 
possibility of imprisonment.79 It may also include a fine or other 
monetary penalty, but only, as the Court explained in Martineau, one that 
“by its magnitude” is imposed to redress “a wrong done to society at 
large, as opposed to the purpose of maintaining the effectiveness” of a 
discrete regulatory or disciplinary regime.80 
IV. GUINDON AND GOODWIN 
In Guindon, a lawyer was assessed a penalty of over a half million 
dollars under the Income Tax Act for issuing charitable tax receipts based 
on false statements.81 She successfully argued at the Tax Court of 
Canada that she was “charged with an offence” under section 11 of the 
Charter and was thus entitled to the rights set out in that provision. The 
Federal Court of Appeal reversed, however, and that reversal was upheld 
by the Supreme Court of Canada.82 
Writing for the majority, Cromwell and Rothstein JJ. looked first to 
the nature of the proceedings, examining both the legislative scheme and 
the features of the process leading to the assessment. The scheme was 
designed, they explained, to capture persons who help to prepare false 
tax information and are either culpably aware of their actions or grossly 
negligent.83 Penalties for such conduct, they concluded, “promote 
                                                                                                                                  
77 Id. See also Martineau, id., at paras. 30-32. 
78 See Martineau, supra, note 76, at para. 45. 
79 Wigglesworth, supra, note 72. 
80 Martineau, supra, note 76, at para. 60 (emphasis in original). 
81 R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), s. 163.2(4) (“Every person who makes, or participates in, 
assents to or acquiesces in the making of, a statement to, or by or on behalf of, another person … 
that the person knows, or would reasonably be expected to know but for circumstances amounting to 
culpable conduct, is a false statement that could be used by or on behalf of the other person for a 
purpose of this Act is liable to a penalty in respect of the false statement.”). 
82 The disposition of the appeal was unanimous, but three of the seven judges on the panel 
declined to deal with the s. 11 issue, holding that: (i) Ms. Guindon failed to comply with the notice 
requirement for constitutional challenges under the Tax Court of Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-2; 
and (ii) there were no grounds for the Court to exercise its discretion to hear the challenge despite 
this failure. See Guindon, supra, note 3, Abella and Wagner JJ., concurring. 
83 Id., at paras. 53-61. 
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honesty and deter gross negligence, or worse, on the part of preparers, 
qualities that are essential to the self-reporting system of income taxation 
assessment”.84 The process employed to determine liability, they  
noted, involved an audit, an opportunity for the individual to make 
representations, a recommendation by the auditor to a review committee, 
a provisional decision by that committee, a further opportunity for 
representations, a final decision, a right of appeal to the Tax Court, and 
in default of payment, a civil collection action.85 This process, they 
asserted, stood in sharp contrast to the process for determining criminal 
sanctions under the Act, which required the laying of an information and 
a trial in a court of criminal jurisdiction.86 They accordingly concluded 
that the scheme was not “criminal in nature”.87 
In addressing the “true penal consequence” test, Cromwell and 
Rothstein JJ. confirmed that the possibility of imprisonment always 
triggers section 11.88 They also reiterated that a monetary penalty will do 
so only when “it is, in purpose or effect, punitive”, considering the 
“magnitude of the fine, to whom it is paid, whether its magnitude is 
determined by regulatory considerations rather than principles of 
criminal sentencing, and whether stigma is associated with the 
penalty”.89 While there is no fixed upper limit on the magnitude of the 
penalty, they wrote, to remain within the administrative realm the penalty 
must not be “out of proportion to the amount required to achieve 
regulatory purposes”.90 That said, large penalties may be justified to 
deter “non-compliance with the administrative or regulatory scheme”91 
and ensure that “the penalty is not simply considered a cost of doing 
business”.92 They concluded that the scheme at issue, which involved a 
                                                                                                                                  
84 Id., at para. 62. 
85 Id., at paras. 66 and 90. 
86 Id., at para. 67. See also Martineau, supra, note 76, at para. 45. 
87 Id., at para. 73. 
88 Id., at para. 76. 
89 Id., at 76. See also Canada (Attorney General) v. United States Steel Corp., [2011] F.C.J. 
No. 726, 2011 FCA 176, 333 D.L.R. (4th) 1, at paras. 76-77 (F.C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2011] 
S.C.C.A. No. 364 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “United States Steel Corp.“]. 
90 Id., at para. 77. 
91 Id. See also id., at para. 79. 
92 See also Lavallee v. Alberta (Securities Commission), [2010] A.J. No. 144, 2010 ABCA 
48, 474 A.R. 295 (Alta. C.A.), affg [2009] A.J. No. 21 (Alta. Q.B.), leave to appeal refused [2010] 
S.C.C.A. No. 119 (S.C.C.); Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v. Chatr Wireless Inc., [2013] 
O.J. No. 3748, 2013 ONSC 5315 (Ont. S.C.J.); United States Steel Corp., supra, note 89, at para. 77; 
Rowan v. Ontario Securities Commission, [2012] O.J. No. 1375, 2012 ONCA 208, at para. 49  
(Ont. C.A.), affg [2010] O.J. No. 5681 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
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maximum penalty of $100,000 plus the individual’s gross compensation 
for each violation, “reflects the objective of deterring” the type of 
misconduct targeted and did not therefore trigger the application of 
section 11.93 
Goodwin94 involved challenges under sections 11 and 8 of the 
Charter to British Columbia’s Automatic Roadside Prohibition (“ARP”) 
scheme.95 That scheme permitted police to administer an “approved 
screening device” (“ASD”) demand to determine a driver’s blood alcohol 
concentration. If the ASD revealed a reading above certain threshold, the 
driver’s licence would be immediately suspended for a period between 
three and 90 days and monetary costs and penalties imposed up to a 
maximum of $4,000.96 Drivers could ask the Superintendent of Motor 
Vehicles to review these penalties, but this review was restricted to the 
questions of whether the applicant was the driver, the ASD registered the 
designated threshold, or the driver unlawfully failed or refused to provide 
a sample.97 
Applying the framework established in Wigglesworth, Martineau 
and Guindon, the Court unanimously (and somewhat summarily) 
dismissed the claim that drivers subject to these penalties were “charged 
with an offence” under section 11 of the Charter.98 It was “evident”, 
Karakatsanis J. wrote, that the proceedings used to impose the penalties 
were “of an administrative nature” and “not criminal”.99 “The proceedings 
                                                                                                                                  
93 Guindon, supra, note 3, at para. 88. 
94 Supra, note 4. The legislation was also (unsuccessfully) challenged on division of powers 
grounds. 
95 Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 318, ss. 94.1-94.6. As discussed, infra, the Act was 
amended in several relevant ways between the time the actions in Goodwin were initiated and the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision. 
96 More specifically, if the reading was 0.08 (milligrams of alcohol / litre of blood) or 
higher, the licence would be suspended for 90 days; if between 0.05 and 0.08, the licence would be 
suspended for three, seven, or 30 days, depending on whether it was the driver’s first, second, or 
subsequent infraction, respectively. In addition, depending on the length of the suspension and other 
factors, the driver’s vehicle could also be impounded. See Goodwin, supra, note 4, at paras. 11-12; 
Motor Vehicle Act, supra, note 95, ss. 215.41-215.46. 
97 Goodwin, supra, note 4, at para. 12. The scheme was later amended to: (i) require “that a 
police officer inform a driver of her right to request and be provided a second ASD test, and, where 
two samples are provided, the lower of the two results is the basis for a driving prohibition”;  
(ii) allow driver’s to challenge the accuracy of the device; and (iii) require police to provide the 
Superintendent with information relating to the calibration of the ASD. See Goodwin, supra, note 4, 
at para. 13. 
98 Goodwin, supra, note 4, at paras. 39-47, Karakatsanis J. and para. 91, McLachlin J., 
dissenting. 
99 Id., at para. 43. 
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are initiated by the drivers themselves”, she added, and there are no 
“prosecutions” or “criminal records” involved.  
Nor, in her view, were the consequences imposed on drivers “truly 
penal”.100 While the suspensions were “meaningful”, they were directly 
related to the “regulatory terms and conditions under which a person  
may be licensed to drive”.101 And while the financial burdens were 
“significant”, the fine was capped at $500, with the remaining costs 
connected to remedial programs (including ignition interlock devices) 
“incidental to the scheme’s objective of getting drivers and vehicles off 
the road”.102  
The Court did find, however, that the lack of a meaningful 
opportunity to challenge the reliability of an “over 0.08” reading violated 
section 8 of the Charter and could not be saved by section 1. The absence 
of the kinds of safeguards subsequently added by the legislature (such as 
requiring police to inform drivers of their right to request a sample from 
a second device and allowing the Superintendent to assess the device’s 
accuracy) meant that the scheme was “unreasonable” under section 8 and 
failed the “minimal impairment” branch of section 1.103  
I do not take a position on whether people facing the administrative 
penalties at issue in Guindon and Goodwin should be entitled to any of 
the particular rights set out in section 11 of the Charter. I do claim, 
however, that the Supreme Court’s construal of “charged with an 
offence” is too restrictive. A more expansive interpretation would allow 
courts to place meaningful limits on legislatures’ ability to impose 
administrative penalties without complying with basic tenets of 
adjudicative fairness. If compliance with these principles is truly 
incompatible with regulatory efficacy, governments can justify 
infringements of section 11 rights under section 1 of the Charter. This is 
how many other Charter rights are interpreted,104 and there is little reason 
to think that under such an approach Canadian courts would suddenly 
attempt a Lochnerian dismantling of welfare state regulation. On the 
                                                                                                                                  
100 Id., at para. 45. 
101 Id., at para. 46. 
102 Id. 
103 Id., at paras. 64-85. 
104 See e.g., the jurisprudence regarding ss. 2, 9, 10(b), 11(d), and 15 of the Charter, in which 
the courts have interpreted the rights expansively while affording legislatures considerable latitude to 
infringe under s. 1 in prescribed circumstances. See generally Hogg, supra, note 51, c. 38. Other 
Charter rights, notably sections 7, 8, and 12, are almost never justified under section 1 because each 
contains an internal limitation permitting courts to balance individual liberties against state interests 
without resort to section 1. See Hogg, supra, note 51, §38.14. 
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contrary, a more flexible reading of section 11 would give Canadians 
confidence that, regardless of the legislature’s chosen means of 
enforcement, they will be assured a minimal level of adjudicative 
fairness in contesting substantial state-imposed penalties. 
But why precisely is the current approach too restrictive? Consider 
first the “criminal in nature” test. Curiously for a component of a 
constitutional right, it is wholly (and I mean wholly) positivistic. It 
provides no check whatsoever on a legislature’s ability to deny 
adjudicative fairness to those facing governmental sanctions. The test 
simply asks the reviewing court to examine and describe the enforcement 
procedure dictated by the legislature. If that process includes the 
conventional elements of a criminal or quasi-criminal prosecution (e.g., 
arrest and summons powers, the laying of an information, trial in a court 
of criminal jurisdiction), it is “criminal in nature”; if not, it is 
administrative. End of story.  
Put differently, the Court has enlisted a method of statutory 
interpretation (i.e., divining legislative purpose or intent) to determine 
the scope of what should be a constitutional limit on governmental 
power. The quantum of deference inhering in this approach is literally 
infinite, exceeding even the minimal “rational basis” standard that 
eventually replaced Lochner.105 The only effect of the “criminal in 
nature” test, therefore, is to signal to legislatures that if they wish to 
evade the strictures of section 11, they must avoid the accoutrements of 
the criminal process in designing enforcement procedures.106  
In theory, the “true penal consequence” test is not entirely devoid of 
normativity. In practice, however, it imposes a virtually unattainable bar 
on rights claimants. The only way for non-carceral sanctions to trigger 
section 11 protection is to be “out of proportion” to regulatory objectives, 
which may include large, deterrence-oriented fines.107 Deterrence, 
however, is also one of the most important aims of criminal sanctioning.108 
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In almost any realm of commercial or financial activity, large fines or 
monetary penalties will at least sometimes be necessary to deter 
infractions. If section 11 can be evaded simply be adverting to such 
(legitimate) objectives, administrative penalty schemes will almost never 
fall within the provision’s scope. Indeed, in an overwhelming proportion 
of cases, courts have found that the monetary penalties imposed or 
available were justified on deterrence grounds and were thus not penal 
consequences.109  
The penal consequence test should therefore be reformulated to 
impose some kind of bright-line limit on monetary penalties. The 
quantum could vary according to prescribed circumstances, such as 
whether the penalty would be imposed on an individual or a corporation. 
In addition, it could be based on a relative rather than absolute value, 
such as a fixed percentage of the maximum fine for any parallel penal 
offence.110 However the limit is calculated, if it were exceeded, section 11 
would apply, and the failure to afford any of its protections would 
constitute a prima facie infringement.  
The test should also be satisfied by sanctions imposing any 
substantial constraint on liberty, such as the imposition of solitary or 
close confinement for a breach of custodial disciplinary rules,111 or even 
the suspension or revocation of a licence, as in Goodwin.112 Such 
penalties can cause considerable social, financial and psychological harm 
and should not be levied without a presumptive constitutional entitlement 
to basic adjudicative fairness.113 
If the penal consequences test were interpreted in this manner, many 
administrative penalty regimes would come under the protection of 
section 11. In some of these cases, granting certain section 11 rights 
could unduly diminish the state’s ability to regulate in the public interest. 
But this consequence should not be assumed; governments should be 
required to demonstrate it. Imposing a justification requirement in 
section 11 cases would be far from radical, and far from Lochnerian. 
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After all, a vast quantity of regulatory law is enforced (by legislative 
choice) through quasi-criminal procedures and punishments.114 There is 
little evidence that the application of section 11 to these processes has 
emboldened wrongdoers, gutted enforcement, or induced the collapse of 
any regulatory regimes. Requiring the state to justify elisions of basic 
adjudicative fairness norms is one thing; striking down maximum hours, 
workplace safety, and minimum wage laws as violations of economic 
due process is another. 
The weakness of the Supreme Court of Canada’s application of the 
administrative-criminal distinction to section 11 law is further illustrated 
by the section 8 analysis in Goodwin. As mentioned, there the Court 
found that denying drivers a meaningful chance to challenge the 
reliability of the ASD reading violated section 8. While the Court’s 
policy objective was laudable — imposing an entitlement to basic 
adjudicative fairness — the use of section 8 to achieve that objective was 
frankly bizarre. The right to be free from unreasonable search or seizure 
has always been interpreted to limit the state’s capacity to invade privacy 
to investigate and prosecute wrongdoing.115 It plays no role in fostering 
adjudicative accuracy. Indeed, successful section 8 applications often 
lead to the exclusion of reliable evidence under section 24(2) of the 
Charter, a consequence at odds with the goal of accurately determining 
the factual basis of the state’s allegations.116 Section 8 is not concerned 
with the ex post reliability of adjudication on the merits, but rather the ex 
ante accuracy of investigative officials’ predictions of wrongdoing.117 
Section 8 presumptively requires warrants and probable grounds, for 
example, not to ensure adjudicative accuracy but prevent unjustified 
investigative intrusions into privacy.  
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Justice Karakatsanis’s majority judgment in Goodwin appears 
oblivious to these tenets. Under the impugned British Columbia 
legislation, police could issue an ASD demand in the same circumstances 
as they could under the Criminal Code.118 The Code permits, and courts 
have upheld under section 8, ASD demands when police reasonably 
suspect impairment.119 The invasion of privacy occasioned by an ASD 
demand under the provincial law, in other words, is no less justified than 
under the Criminal Code. The ex ante probability of wrongdoing in each 
case is the same.  
Of course, the consequences of a failed ASD test differ under the two 
regimes. Under the Code, a failed test gives police probable grounds to 
arrest and issue a demand for a (more accurate) breathalyzer test, the 
results of which are admissible at trial to prove liability (the ASD reading 
is not admissible for this purpose).120 Under the British Columbia Act, in 
contrast, police were required to issue the driving prohibition when they 
had probable grounds to believe, based on the ASD reading, that the 
driver was impaired.121 The ASD result was thus considered directly in 
determining liability. 
But this difference should not be relevant to section 8. Indeed, under 
the Code a failed ASD test results in much more privacy-invasive 
consequences (e.g., arrest, continued detention, further takings of bodily 
samples) than under the provincial law. All of the concerns raised by 
Karakatsanis J. relate to adjudicative accuracy, not privacy. Indeed, they 
fall naturally within the parameters of the right to a “fair and public 
hearing” in section 11(d) of the Charter. But since she excluded the 
regime from the scope of section 11, this option was not available. 
Instead, the manifest unfairness of the situation compelled her to impose 
adjudicative norms by other means. Unfortunately, these norms fit 
awkwardly with section 8’s language and purpose and do considerable 
violence to the conceptual coherence of the jurisprudence. One can only 
hope that future courts will ignore this unfortunate analysis. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Canadian courts were right to be skeptical of Lochner, but the fear 
that it fostered has become anachronistic. Early on, some commentators 
on the left predicted that the Charter would be used by Lochnerian judges 
to dismantle the Canadian welfare state.122 Just as with concerns from 
segments of the right that the Charter would gut legislative supremacy,123 
these predictions have proved inaccurate. The state’s involvement in the 
economy and regulation of enterprise is alive and well, and judges have 
exhibited little appetite for resisting it. 
Unfortunately, the doctrinal structures that emerged out of the fear of 
Lochner continue to hamper the development of a more nuanced, 
pragmatic and protective framework for assuring adjudicative fairness in 
administrative penalty schemes. Guindon and Goodwin represent missed 
opportunities to transform the crude criminal-administrative binary into a 
flexible continuum capable of achieving a better balance between 
individual and collective interests. 
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